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INTRODUCTION*
Alison L Booth, Juan J. Dolado and Jeff Frank
European countries have adopted widely varying policies concerning employment
protection. In economies where permanent workers have high levels of employ
ment protection, temporary contracts can provide a mechanism enhancing labour
market flexibility, since firms can adjust their workforces by varying the number of
temporary workers. In Spain and, to a lesser extent, France countries charac
terised by high levels of employment protection there has been a dramatic
growth in temporary jobs over the last 15 years. The experience of Britain pro
vides a contrast, since weak employment protection has been associated with a low
and stable percentage of the workforce in temporary jobs. Recently, EU policy
makers have turned their attention to temporary jobs, and required the extension
of employment protection to temporary workers.1
This symposium gathers together comparative evidence on the nature and
evolution of temporary work in countries with different regulatory frameworks and
different labour market conditions. Some of the evidence is microeconomic,
providing information on the extent to which temporary jobs are ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in
terms of worker compensation and career possibilities. Other evidence is macro
economic, and sheds light both on forces that may explain the rise in temporary
work and on the consequences of an increased prevalence of temporary jobs. The
four papers in the symposium examine temporary work in four EU countries:
Britain, France, Spain and Sweden. The reason for looking across countries is that
the differing institutions in each country notably the degree of employment
protection allow us to examine different features of temporary work. Britain
provides the benchmark case where weak employment protection means that the
outcome follows an essentially unregulated market. Sweden and France have
maintained employment protection at about the average levels in Europe for the
past fifteen years. Both, however, show sharp rises in temporary work over the
period, although as discussed in the papers possibly for very different reasons.
Spain is an interesting extreme example where temporary work is far higher than
* Thanks to Olivier Blanchard, Bertil Holmlund and the Editor for helpful comments.
1 Temporary work is increasingly falling under the aegis of EU Directives, as indicated in the 1999
EU Directive concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work. For information, see the
Department of Trade and Industry site (http://www.dti.gov.uk/er/europe/directives.htm).
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elsewhere in the EU, despite several reforms attempting to reduce employment
protection restrictions over the last 15 years. In effect, Spain represents the
opposite extreme to the British experience.
1. A Framework for Analysis
‘Temporary employment’ has a number of different meanings. Some temporary
work (for example, farm or vacation employment) is, by its nature, seasonal or
casual. For other jobs, where the work itself does not dictate temporary employ
ment, the job is temporary due to a characteristic of the employment contract under
which the worker is hired, namely its fixed term duration. Throughout this sym
posium, we distinguish between seasonal/casual temporary jobs, on the one hand,
and fixed term contract employment on the other. In some cases, it may be effi
cient for seasonal/casual workers to hold their jobs on a temporary basis given that
this fits the demand for their labour. The same can be true for fixed term contracts
for several different reasons. Hence, it is useful to distinguish between the fol
lowing types of temporary work:
1 Employment under probation
In some countries, the regular employment contract specifies an initial
period during which the worker can be fired if unsatisfactory without the
termination costs that apply at later stages of the employment relationship.
In other countries, an initial temporary contract serves the same function
an unsatisfactory worker will not be offered a permanent contract at the
end of the temporary appointment. This will typically be the case if the
employment protection legislation (EPL) limits the use of probationary
periods in regular employment contracts.2
2 Temporary workers under replacement contracts
These may substitute for permanent workers on leave for different reasons,
including maternity or disability/sickness.
3 Temporary workers under fixed term contracts
These may serve as a buffer stock that allows firms to adjust to changes in the
business environment due to seasonal or other transitory causes.
These reasons for fixed term contracts assume an environment where perman
ent workers have high employment protection, but temporary workers do not.
They also depend on the ability of firms to offer temporary contracts, a right that is
limited in some European countries.
We now look at data from European countries to put our four country studies
into perspective, and to provide preliminary indications as to whether there are
relationships between employment protection and the extent of temporary work.
Table 1 summarises the incidence of temporary employment in EU countries and
lists restrictions applying to the use of these contracts in the 1990s. Since the
2 There is evidence of this in Spain, for example, where the maximum length for probationary
periods is six months for professionals and two months for non-professionals, according to Article 14 of
the Workers’ Statute. The same happens for apprenticeship contracts that cannot exceed three years.
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Table 1
Temporary Employment Across Europe
% Temporary employees
1985 1990 1996 1998 Restrictions to the use of fixed-term contracts
Spain 15.6 29.8 33.6 32.9 No restrictions for jobs of limited duration
Men 14.4 27.8 31.9 32.1 (seasonal, casual eventual jobs); since 1994, they
Women 18.4 34.2 36.7 34.4 cannot be used for permanent jobs
Finland 10.5 11.5 17.3 17.7 Can be used for temporary substitutions and
Men 9.6 14.1 13.3 special needs of firms of certain characteristics
Women 11.3 20.5 21.9
Portugal 14.4 18.3 10.6 17.3 Can be used by new firms or to hire first job-
Men 13.5 16.8 10.2 16.2 seekers and long-term unemployed
Women 15.9 20.5 11.1 18.6
France 4.7 10.5 12.6 13.9 Restricted to ‘objective’ situations: seasonal jobs,
Men 4.8 9.4 11.5 13.0 temporary substitutions, training contracts and
Women 4.6 12.0 13.9 15.0 some subsidised jobs in the public sector
Greece 21.1 16.5 11.0 13.0 Only for seasonal jobs
Men 21.8 16.9 10.5 12.0
Women 19.6 15.0 11.9 14.7
Sweden 10.6 10.1 13.8 15.5 Can be used for temporary substitutions, training
Men n.a. 7.4 11.9 12.9 contracts and transitory increases in production;
Women n.a. 12.8 15.8 18.1 also (since 1997) without reason for at most five
employers within each firm
Germany 10.0 10.5 11.1 12.3 Could be used only under objective causes before
Men 9.2 9.8 11.0 12.1 1986 and even without since then
Women 11.1 11.6 11.2 12.5
Netherlands 7.5 7.6 12.0 12.7 Restrictions against repeated use
Men 5.9 6.1 9.1 10.2
Women 10.8 10.2 15.9 16.1
Denmark 12.3 10.8 11.2 10.1 For specific workers, mostly in professional
Men 11.6 10.6 10.8 9.3 services and the construction sector
Women 13.1 11.0 11.8 11.0
Austria n.a n.a 8.0 7.8 No restrictions for the first contract
Men n.a n.a. 8.1 8.0
Women n.a n.a. 7.9 7.7
Italy 4.8 5.2 7.5 8.6 Since 1987, under any provisions established by
Men 3.6 3.9 6.6 7.5 collective bargaining agreements
Women 7.0 7.6 8.9 10.3
Ireland 7.3 8.5 9.2 n.a. No restrictions
Men 5.5 6.6 7.1 n.a.
Women 15.5 17.6 22.2 n.a.
UK 7.0 5.2 7.1 7.1 No restrictions
Men 5.7 3.7 6.0 6.0
Women 8.8 7.0 8.2 8.3
Belgium 6.9 5.3 5.9 7.8 No restrictions within the first two years of
Men 4.7 3.3 4.5 5.9 contract
Women 10.9 8.6 8.0 10.4
Source: OECD (1999), Statistics Sweden (1997) and European Commission (1999).
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mid 1980s, there has been a tendency, in most EU countries (the exceptions being
Greece, the UK and greater Denmark), towards an increase in the percentage of
temporary employees in the economy. This is associated with the introduction of
new contractual types entailing greater flexibility, notably in Germany and Italy.3
Spain, after a widespread extension of fixed term contracts for regular activities,
has moved in the opposite direction, limiting their use for permanent jobs.
Nonetheless, Spain has also shown an increased percentage of temporary work at
33% of the workforce. Sweden has experienced a substantial rise in temporary
work over the 1990s, following a sharp increase in unemployment. By the early
1990s, fixed term contracts accounted for 10% of the number of employees; by the
end of the decade, they accounted for 15.5%. This development has taken place
despite only marginal changes in the regulatory framework. Interestingly, the UK
(along with Ireland) has a very low and stable rate of temporary work despite
having no regulations against the use of such contracts. The USA not shown in
the table had just 4.5% of its workforce in temporary work in 1999 (OECD,
2001).4 This lack of a simple relationship between restrictions on temporary
contracts and the levels of temporary jobs in the economy motivates much of the
analysis in this symposium.
One hypothesis is that the incidence of temporary jobs is positively related to
EPL for permanent jobs, and negatively related to the extent of EPL for temporary
jobs. Do the data across Europe support this hypothesis? Since there are many
legal provisions affecting not only redundancies under a regular permanent
contract but also the use of temporary contracts, it is not an easy task to summarise
in a single indicator the main differences in the degree of strictness of EPL
across countries. Nonetheless, there have been several attempts at constructing
such an indicator, the most widely used being that of the OECD (1999). This
weights several provisions (notice period, severance payments, etc.) under both
types of contracts. Figs 1a and 1b depict the relationship between the percentage of
temporary employment and the OECD indicator of EPL strictness under both
permanent and temporary employment, respectively. The sample consists of EU
countries during the 1980s and 1990s, with the regression lines estimated from the
cross country sample of 27 observations.5 The UK is found towards the origin,
while Spain is an outlier towards the top of the figures. France and Sweden are
found towards the middle.
As the figures illustrate, there is a positive relationship between the percentage
of temporary contracts and both types of indicator, though this is much stronger
with respect to the degree of EPL strictness regarding permanent contracts. The
positive correlation in Fig. 1a can be interpreted as a clear sign that temporary
contracts act as a way of providing employment flexibility in those countries with
severe EPL for permanent jobs.
3 Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti (2000) presents a detailed account of EPL reforms in the EU over
the 1986–97 period.
4 This figure for the USA relates to ‘contingent’ workers, that is, those expecting their work will end
in the near future for economic as opposed to personal reasons (OECD, 2001, p. 118).
5 The sample comprises 14 EU countries for two time-periods, except for Austria which has just one
observation for the 1990s (no data were available for Austria for the 1980s).
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Fig. 1. (a) ‘Strictness’ of EPL (regular employment) and Temporary Employment
(b) ‘Strictness’ of EPL (temporary employment) and Temporary Employment
Source: OECD (1999) and European Commission (1999)
Legend: E. Spain. P. Portugal. FIN: Finland, GRE: Greece, F: France, S: Sweden, NET:
The Netherlands, G: Germany, A: Austria, IT: Italy, D: Denmark, B: Belgium, IRE:
Ireland, UK: United Kingdom
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It is surprising, however, that temporary employment increases with EPL strictness
regarding temporary contracts (albeit not significantly if Spain is excluded from
the sample) as shown in Fig. 1b. One possible explanation of this odd result is that
the EPL indicator of temporary jobs does not influence the share of temporary
jobs at all, and that it has a positive estimated coefficient in the previous bivariate
regression because it is positively correlated with the EPL permanent jobs indi
cator, which is the genuine determinant of that share. Indeed, in a regression of
the percentage of temporary employment on both EPL indicators, only the one
pertaining to the use of permanent contracts is found to be statistically signifi
cant.6 Hence, on the whole, the previous evidence suggests a strong positive
correlation between the extent of temporary jobs and the EPL strictness regarding
permanent contracts, whereas the EPL strictness of temporary jobs hardly plays
any role.
2. The Papers in the Symposium
The rise in temporary jobs in much of western Europe during the 1990s can be
seen, in part, as arising from deliberate policy. As shown above, there is evidence
that, in countries with high EPL for permanent jobs, temporary jobs can provide
labour market flexibility.
In the first paper in the symposium, Booth, Francesconi and Frank examine
the benchmark case of Britain. Britain is a largely unregulated labour market,
where firms have low EPL for both permanent and temporary jobs. There are few
restrictions on the use of fixed term contracts. In this environment, what are the
characteristics of temporary jobs? This paper uses data from the British House
hold Panel Survey, for the period 1991 7, to confirm some common but hitherto
unsubstantiated beliefs about unregulated temporary jobs. Workers are less
happy in these jobs, they receive less training and (after controlling for a wide
range of explanatory variables) are paid less. Policies that create more temporary
jobs are therefore likely to be creating bad jobs. What are the career prospects of
temporary jobs? This paper finds that there is a scarring effect for men men
who begin their careers in temporary jobs continue to have income penalties
long after they have moved into permanent jobs. Interestingly, this is not ne
cessarily the case for women women who begin in temporary jobs catch up to
women who started their careers in permanent jobs. This makes the important
point that temporary work may well have different impacts across gender.
In the second paper in our symposium, Blanchard and Landier model the
partial (two tier) reform of employment protection that has occurred in some
European countries characterised by high EPL, and where employment of workers
on fixed term contracts has been encouraged instead of the alternative of lowering
EPL for permanent jobs. They show that such a partial reform may have perverse
effects: there may be higher turnover in fixed term contracts leading to higher
6 A regression of the proportion of temporary employment (TEMP) on a constant, EPL for
permanent employees (EPLP) and EPL for temporary employees (EPLT) yields: TEMP ¼ 3.43 +
3.56EPLP + 0.04EPLT (with t-ratios of 2.60 and 0.05 for the estimated coefficients of EPLP and EPLT,
respectively).
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unemployment. Even if unemployment were to be reduced by such a policy,
workers might be worse off through experiencing multiple spells of unemploy
ment and fixed term contracts before finding regular employment. Evidence from
French data from the Enqueˆtes Emploi for young workers over the period 1983 90
suggests that reforms have increased worker turnover, while worsening the welfare
of young workers.
Both the British and French studies, therefore, cast doubt on the desirability of
expansion of temporary jobs. A different viewpoint arises in the third paper of our
symposium by Holmlund and Storrie that charts the rise in temporary work in
Sweden over the 1990s. Most of the increase occurred during the severe recession
of the early 1990s with very high levels of unemployment. Using Labour Force
Survey data, they show that temporary and regular employment display different
cyclical behaviour, as one would expect. Their analysis suggests that the rise cannot
be explained by legislative changes, by changes in the composition of the labour
force, or by shifts in the sectoral composition of employment. An important factor
behind the rising prevalence of temporary work appears to be the severe recession
that has made firms more prone to substitute temporary for ‘permanent’ contracts
and workers more willing to accept short term contracts. The Swedish experience
suggests, as may well be the case for other Nordic countries affected by the collapse
of the USSR, that adverse macroeconomic shocks can trigger substantial increases
in temporary work.7
The fourth paper in our symposium by Dolado, Garcia Serrano and Jimeno
takes stock of the available evidence for Spain. This study investigates the
consequences of a very segmented labour market (in which one third of
employees are under very flexible employment contracts with low severance
payments and two thirds are under permanent employment contracts with very
high employment protection) on a wide variety of dimensions of the labour
market. The aim is to draw useful lessons for other countries that might try to
weaken employment protection through divisive two tier reforms. The authors
also address the puzzle of why temporary employment in Spain remains so high
to date, despite the countervailing labour market reforms of the 1990s and
2001. They find that those reforms have reduced the share of temporary jobs in
the private sector by about 4 percentage points, but that such a reduction has
been partially offset by an increase of the share in the public sector for reasons
related to fiscal consolidation and to the implementation of active labour
market policies. Hence, although the overall share of temporary work remains
little changed, the policy implications may be different from those in the past,
to the extent that many of the temporary jobs created by the public sector
increase the ‘employability’ of workers with specific difficulties in the labour
market.
7 The rise in temporary work in Sweden cannot be explained by leave replacements, but it is
interesting that leave replacements account for 4–5% of the numbers of employees in Sweden,
a proportion which has remained fairly stable during the 1990s.
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3. Summary
Overall, the papers in this symposium suggest that the expansion of temporary jobs
as a way of increasing labour market flexibility may be undesirable. In the absence
of strong employment protection for permanent jobs, as in Britain, temporary jobs
are from worker’s perspective bad jobs, with possible long term career impli
cations, in particular for men. Even where there is strong EPL for permanent jobs
as in France the expansion of temporary jobs may be undesirable, leading to
high turnover among younger workers. The Swedish study, investigating the causes
of the rapid growth in temporary work over the 1990s, suggests that adverse
macroeconomic shocks can trigger substantial increases in temporary work. Fi
nally, the Spanish study shows that, once temporary jobs are entrenched in a dual
labour market, later reforms to restrict their growth can be unsuccessful, indica
ting that attempts to reduce firing costs for permanent contracts have so far been
insufficient.
Australian National University, University of Essex and CEPR
Universidad Carlos III and CEPR
Royal Holloway College, University of London
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